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The Liberian civil war, which triggered 
the refugee crisis, began in December 
1989 when theNationalPatrioticFront of 
Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor 
crossed the border from Cdte d'Ivoire 
and attacked the government forces in 
the Nimba area, which is inhabited 
mostly by Gio and Mano tribes. The Li- 
berian army of Samuel Doe's govern- 
ment retaliated against the civilian 
population of Nimba by burning and 
looting villages, and killing at will. The 
barbaric actions of the government 
forces encouraged more Gio and Mano 
civilians to join the rebel forces. The 
NPFL in turn attacked civilians from the 
president's Krahn tribe and the 
Mandingoes who appeared to support 
theDoe regime. In no time, the campaign 
to overthrow the Doe government be- 
came a brutal tribal-based civil war. 
As the war spread to other countries, 
thousands of Liberians fled to the neigh- 
bouring West African countries of 
Guinea, Cdte dlIvoire, Sierra Leone, 
Ghana and Nigeria. Those refugees were 
welcomed by their hosts in an unprec- 
edented way. In many villages border- 
ing Liberia, the refugees and indigenous 
people are of the same ethnic group and 
speak the same language. Many are rela- 
tives or acquaintances. The locals took in 
refugees and shared their land and food 
with them. Although there was no need 
to establish refugee camps, external as- 
sistance was required. However, the in- 
ternationalcommunity failed to respond 
immediately, and it was to be many 
months before relief was to reach the 
host village communities in the neigh- 
bouring countries, most of whom were 
already impoverished before the refu- 
gee influx. 
Voluntary Repatriation 
The military and political conflict in 
Liberia is not yet resolved. Liberia is cur- 
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rently divided into three parts. The In- 
terim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU), installed by the Economic Com- 
munity of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and protected by the Eco- 
nomic Community Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), controls only the capital of 
Monrovia. The United Liberation Move- 
ment for Democracy (ULIMO), which 
consists mainly of what isleft of theDoe's 
army, has recently captured the Bomi 
and Cape Mount areas from the NPFL, 
who rule the rest of the country. Efforts 
to settle the disputes are hampered by 
the NPFL, which rejects the ECOWAS- 
brokered peace agreements that call for 
all warring factions to disarm and en- 
camp their fighters before holding free 
and fair elections. 
In the two years since ECOMOG in- 
stalled the interim government in 
Monrovia, approximately 80,000 Libe- 
rian refugees have returned home to 
Monrovia. The number of spontaneous 
returnees in NPFL-held territory is not 
known, but is believed to be low because 
refugees want their security guaranteed 
before repatriating. Currently, the secu- 
rity in Liberia is precarious, particularly 
in areas outside of Monrovia. In early 
October 1992, Charles Taylor formally 
declared war on ECOMOG, threatened 
to attackMonrovia, and NPFL forces and 
ECOMOG forces are currently fighting 
on the outskirts of the capital. 
Alternative Approaches to 
Repatriation 
In addition to spontaneous return, other 
forms of repatriation are being consid- 
ered in Liberia. However, there are some 
bureaucratic prerequisites before the 
UNHCR-assisted organized repatria- 
tion can take place. For example, a gen- 
eral amnesty should be given for all 
combatants. A triparty agreement be- 
tween the UNHCR, the countries of asy- 
lum and Liberia that ensures the 
protection of returnees should be ef- 
fected. Organized repatriation cannot 
take place with the current conflict and 
lack of a recognized government in 
Liberia. 
As an alternative, a less bureaucratic 
semiorganized repatriation is being con- 
sidered. Under this form of repatriation, 
returning refugees are given informa- 
tion, a transport allowance and a 
reintegration package at the final desti- 
nation. Prospective returnees find their 
own way to their villages. The 
semiorganized repatriation provides 
some material assistance, but does not 
guarantee the protection of the 
returnees, which is particularly crucial 
in times of conflict. How can protection 
of returnees be assured in such cases? 
Issues related to the protection of return- 
ing Liberian refugees was not discussed 
during the series of talks between the 
warring factions. UNHCR and the 
United Nations did not participate in 
these talks where a cease-fire between 
the waning factions was negotiated by 
ECOWAS. 
Returnees and Liberia's Internal 
Politics 
The Liberian refugees in neighbouring 
countries constitute almost one-third of 
Liberia's total population. Thus, their 
vote would have a major impact on the 
outcome of future elections. Because 
most of the refugees fled from areas cap- 
tured by Charles Taylor's NPFL and 
many of them were mistreated by the 
rebel forces, some politicians in 
Monrovia would like the election to be 
held after refugees are repatriated to 
capitalize on this fad. The Interim Gov- 
ernment of National Unity has an active 
repatriation commission that advocates 
repatriation of refugees despite the stale- 
matein the political settlement. The com- 
mission vigorously pursues its objectives 
of returningas many refugees as possible 
to Monrovia before elections are held. It 
raises funds through soccer games and 
collects donations from various charities 
in order to facilitate the transportation of 
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